

## Contents

| <i>Acknowledgements</i>                                  | <i>page ix</i> |
|----------------------------------------------------------|----------------|
| Introduction                                             | 1              |
| 1 Descriptivism                                          | 7              |
| 1.1 Millianism and Linguistic Referentialism             | 7              |
| 1.2 Frege and the Co-Reference Problem                   | 10             |
| 1.2.1 The Co-Reference Puzzle                            | 10             |
| 1.2.2 Frege's First Solution                             | 12             |
| 1.2.3 Frege's Second Solution                            | 14             |
| 1.3 Russell and the No-Reference Problem                 | 18             |
| 1.3.1 The No-Reference Puzzle                            | 18             |
| 1.3.2 Russell's Solution                                 | 19             |
| 1.4 Descriptivism and Possible World Semantics           | 25             |
| 2 The Referentialist Revolution                          | 29             |
| 2.1 Kripke on Proper Names                               | 29             |
| 2.1.1 Stating the Description Theory of Names            | 29             |
| 2.1.2 Disentangling the Epistemic and Modal Categories   | 34             |
| 2.1.3 The Modal Argument and Rigidity                    | 36             |
| 2.1.4 The Semantic Argument and Millianism               | 40             |
| 2.1.5 The Epistemic Argument                             | 46             |
| 2.2 Putnam on Natural Kind Terms                         | 49             |
| 2.2.1 The Twin-Earth Argument                            | 49             |
| 2.2.2 Different Argumentative Strategies and Conclusions | 52             |
| 2.2.3 Natural Kind Terms and Rigidity                    | 55             |
| 2.3 Kaplan on Demonstratives                             | 58             |
| 2.3.1 Indexicality and Rigidity                          | 58             |
| 2.3.2 Characters and Direct Reference                    | 61             |
| 3 Three Puzzles Arising from the Rigidity Thesis         | 65             |
| 3.1 The Epistemic Transparency of Content                | 65             |
|                                                          | vii            |

| viii                                                                | Contents |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|
| 3.2 The Modal Analysis of Content                                   | 72       |
| 3.3 The Three Puzzles                                               | 75       |
| 3.3.1 The Necessary A Posteriori                                    | 75       |
| 3.3.2 The Contingent A Priori                                       | 81       |
| 3.3.3 Empty Names                                                   | 85       |
| 4 Varieties of Descriptivist Responses                              | 89       |
| 4.1 Several Notions of Rigidity                                     | 89       |
| 4.1.1 Rigidity <i>De Facto</i> versus Rigidity <i>De Jure</i>       | 89       |
| 4.1.2 Direct Reference and Singular Propositions                    | 98       |
| 4.2 Wide-Scope Conventionalism                                      | 103      |
| 4.3 <i>Actually</i> and Indexical Descriptions                      | 108      |
| 4.4 <i>Dthat</i> and Demonstrative Descriptions                     | 113      |
| 4.5 Referential Uses of Descriptions and Linguistic Instrumentalism | 119      |
| 4.6 The Causal Picture of the Reference of Names                    | 131      |
| 4.7 Causal Descriptivism                                            | 143      |
| 4.8 Metalinguistic Descriptivism                                    | 155      |
| 4.9 Provisional Conclusions                                         | 170      |
| 5 Two-Dimensionalism                                                | 174      |
| 5.1 The Core Ideas                                                  | 174      |
| 5.2 Soames against Modal Monism                                     | 181      |
| 5.3 The Pragmatic Interpretation                                    | 190      |
| 5.4 The Semantic Interpretation                                     | 203      |
| 5.5 The Epistemic Interpretation                                    | 215      |
| 5.6 The Metasemantic Interpretation                                 | 222      |
| 5.7 The Metasyntactic Interpretation                                | 228      |
| 5.7.1 Explaining the Necessary A Posteriori                         | 237      |
| 5.7.2 Explaining the Contingent A Priori                            | 240      |
| 5.7.3 Explaining Empty Names                                        | 241      |
| 5.7.4 Twin-Languages                                                | 247      |
| Conclusion                                                          | 254      |
| <i>Glossary</i>                                                     | 258      |
| <i>Works Cited</i>                                                  | 266      |
| <i>Index</i>                                                        | 282      |